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 PEER ZUMBANSEN* 
 
Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, 
Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of 
Reflexive Law** 
 
This  paper analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and 
neo-functionalist approaches to law-making at a time when the state is 
seeking to reassert, reformulate and reconceptualize its regulatory 
competence, both domestically and transnationally. While the earlier turn to 
alternative regulation modes, conceptualized under the heading of "legal 
pluralism,' '"responsive law,'' or "refiexive law" in the 1970s and 1980s, had 
aimed at a more socially responsive, contextualized, and ultimately learning 
mode of legal intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist 
jurisprudence  and its reliance on "social norms" embraces a limitation 
model of legal regulation. After revisiting the Legal Realist critique of 
Formalism and the formulation of functionalist regulation as a progressive 
agenda, this paper compares the American and German experiences with 
the rise of the social interventionist state in order to ask where law stand s 
"after the welfare state" at the outset of the twenty-first century. 
 
 
 
 
I. THE DEMISE OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE 
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
For some time now, scholars in law, the social sciences and 
economics have been debating the future of legal regulation in an 
increasingly denationalized world. The reasons for this inquiry emerge 
from a wide variety of places and backgrounds, and every discipline has 
been carving its own particular lens through which it perceives, traces 
and assesses the specific trajectories of institutional and conceptual 
change. A hallmark of these efforts is the growing interpenetration of 
disciplinary discourses, with "globalization studies" having emerged as 
either the crystallization or final diffusion point-whichever perspective 
one may wish to take. In the interim, writings and courses in 
 "globalization and . . . ." studies have become a more or less satisfactory 
label for these border-crossing inquiries into the driving forces of global 
regulatory changes, national path-dependencies and newly emerging norm-
creating actors. Despite their political divisions, these studies, which have 
produced numerous guides to these phenomena from within very vibrant 
scholarly discourses, 1 suggest that there is no way back to a world before 
globalization.2 
One way, then, of identifying the consequences of globalization has 
been to celebrate the "liberation" of commercial actors from government 
intervention by making effective use of jurisdictional forumshopping, tax 
havens and radically decentralized business organization structures. 
Another one, arguably on the other end of the choicecontinuum, would 
seek to radicalize globalization's de-hierarchization trends3 in search of 
realizing and nurturing civic and other bottom-up emancipatory powers, 
however uncomfortably and inevitably they remain situated between 
assertions of the global and the local.4 
Rejecting findings of unstoppable convergence across distinct 
political economies, globalization scholars point to the ever-recurring, 
well-known, nation-state-based distinctions and argumentative patterns: 
where proponents of globalization elevate the necessary containment of 
government regulation of market affairs as the defining feature of a 
globalized world, critics deconstruct such claims as "ideology."5 
The question remains, where to go from there? Karl Polanyi's 
concern with the "double movement" constituted by the emancipation of 
 individual autonomy and the pursuit of public welfare, which he 
identified as the greatest challenge posed by the self-regulating market at 
the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries,6 is still on the agenda-or 
is it? 
An answer to this question is anything but obvious. The 
fundamental institutional reference points of political and legal regulation 
throughout the West in the twentieth century have become thoroughly 
unanchored, and as we see a conceptual shift from "government to 
governance" in contemporary sociological and political analysis, 7 law-in 
this scenario-appears to have become a fragile project. After its rise 
through the Rule of Law, the Social Interventionist State and the Welfare 
State, its contemporary fate seems to be both sealed and indeterminate. 
Sealed with respect to the state's fading regulatory impact on border-
crossing societal entities and activities, which have powerfully 
emancipated themselves from jurisdictional boundaries and 
confinements. Indeterminate, in turn, in at least two ways: the state 
might be reasserting itself either as unitary actor or through regulatory 
cooperation and concerted efforts against global threats such as 
environmental destruction or terrorism. Then, again, it might not.8 The 
second avenue towards indeterminacy is paved with strong doubts as to 
the state's capacity to remain an influential institution in channeling and 
shaping political governance domestically. As the state becomes one of 
several actors in a dramatically de-hierarchized knowledge society, the 
state's proprium-political government, market regulation, administration, 
 responsibility for social infrastructure, guarantor of institutional 
arrangements (education, health, safety) that during the Welfare State's era 
were created to complement a constantly expanding body of individual 
rights9-seems to have come undone. Alternatives to state-originating, 
"public" governance models abound, and proposals of "post-regulatory," 
"new," and "experimental" governance are offered both in competition to 
separation-of-powers and hierarchy-defined models 10 and in descriptive 
fashion to depict, more adequately, the complex structures of today's 
intersection of politics and economics. 11 
Much of the current mapping work of the knowledge society that is 
being done in the social sciences 12 and law13 unfolds in parallel with 
incredibly fruitful economics research, predominantly within "New 
Institutional Economics"-both inside14 and outside15 of its dis- 
 
ciplinary confines. As these interdisciplinary findings are beginning to 
be translated back towards a more challenging reassessment of respective 
doctrinal and conceptual starting points, 16 the erosion of distinctions such 
as publidprivate, economics/politics or state/market is mirrored by a 
renewed, radical push for applied, objective sciences. Perhaps because 
said distinctions become regarded as representative idiosyncrasies of a 
century bogged down in the struggle over competing political economy 
utopias, some of today's analytical assessments and policy prescriptions 
read strangely simple and straightforward. 17 Yet, as is well known, the 
devil is in the details, and these details lie in the ever-more complex 
 structure of today's invaryingly interdependent societies. As we seek to 
rescue the larger questions around societal organization from the 
twentieth into the twenty-first century against the background of 
concepts, instruments and tools that are dramatically losing their 
explanatory power, the consequences for disciplines such as law, 
economics, sociology or political science have for some time now 18 
started to unfold, 19 both in research and teaching.20 
This paper raises the question of the fate of law in the arrangements 
of twenty-first century post-regulatory regimes. It does so with the single 
mandate of contrasting the manifold implications and involvements of 
law in societal organization during the last century with its precarious and 
endangered place in today's domestic and transnational settings. Choosing 
formalism and functionalism as the central methodological tenets in 
present-day contentions of law's place in the regulation of societal 
affairs, this paper seeks to illuminate the background and prospects of 
this development by revisiting the functionalist critique of legal 
formalism at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century onward 
until the demise of normative functionalism in the retreating welfare-state 
of the late twentieth century (II). The next section compares the critique 
of welfare state "juridification" by both conservatives and progressives as 
it emerged in Western European legal thought in the 1970s and 1980s 
with the emergence of legal pluralism and "extra-legal activism" in the 
United States at that time, tracing the rise of responsive and reflexive 
law (III) before addressing the current return of formalism and 
 functionalism in the area of contract law (IV). Section V concludes. 
 
II. LAW'S PRECARIOUS POSITION IN THE POST-REGULATORY STATE 
A Formalism and Functionalism as Methodological Ground Rules 
Throughout the last century, the modes of legal regulation were 
continuously contested, challenged and differentiated as the arms of the 
state began to reach ever deeper into the spheres of societal activity. In 
contrast, the current formalist legal discourse suggests a deep skepticism 
towards the concept of "order through law" altogether. This 
renaissance of legal formalism occurs at a time of profound changes 
in societal governance. It is this context of social change that gives the 
current legal theory assessments such crucial weight and impact. As 
the shift "from government to governance" points to an irreversible 
transformation from hierarchically organized political regulation to a 
hierarchy of conflicting and competing regulatory models, the fate of 
law itself, previously deeply implicated in the formulation of political 
governance, is becoming highly precarious. What is problematic in the 
neo-formalist focus on the 'here and now' is the loss of historical 
reference points, by which contemporary contentions could be re-
embedded or contrasted with preceding experiences in legal regulation. 
As today's turn to private ordering arguably occurs in response to the 
dramatic challenges for legal regulation domestically and 
transnationally, its present triumph comes at the price of making 
invisible, the deeply dialectic nature of law in its eternal coexistence 
 with alternative forms of social regulation that have marked law 
during the twentieth century. 
Today's neo-formalist attack on legal regulation is complemented by a 
neo-functionalist prioritization of private ordering over "state 
intervention." Neo-functionalism defines the role of law and the state 
through  the single mandate  of facilitating individual  autonomy. 
Whereas much of the twentieth century was characterized by the central 
role of the state and by the creation of policy-driven legal norms and 
judicial opinions that fueled an ambitious program of social engineering 
through law, present contentions of functionalism emphasize the values 
of market freedom and competition as endangered by state intervention. 
With unacknowledged irony, this substitution of a functionalist 
protection of the interests of society through law with a large-scale 
retreat of the state in the name of individual freedom and the "demands 
of the market" employs the very theoretical tools that progressive lawyers 
in the United States and in Europe promoted during the 1970s and 1980s 
as responses to the regulatory crisis of the welfare state. Those 
progressive scholars had turned to alternative modes of legal regulation 
seeking to translate law's generality into contextual, learning forms of 
socio-legal regulation. Their hope had been thereby to save the political 
ambitions of the welfare state, while continuing the socio-political debate 
over the substance and direction of political intervention. In contrast, 
today's neo-formalism and neo-functionalism threatens to cut the ties 
between current quest to answer the challenges of globalization and the 
 previous struggles over law and politics. Its proponents characterize legal 
regulation as inappropriately policy-driven and as undue infringement of 
the societal actors' capacity to regulate their own affairs autonomously. 
Contract law provides one example. If today's neo-formalists criticize 
contract law as paternalistic, cost-producing and competition stifling, they 
posit that contractual bargains would, if left alone, be more efficient and 
productive. 21 This assessment is a-historical in that it bears no connection 
with decades of negotiation over the optimal degree of protection afforded 
to the interests of contracting parties in a fast-evolving mass-consumer 
society. The cloud of neoformalist contentions that judges are allegedly 
incompetent in their dealings with complex contractual arrangements 22 
makes this multidimensional, complex nature of contractual  governance 
disappear. 23 
Touching here24 on one of these fields-contract law-the paper 
analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and neo-
functionalist approaches to law-making in light of the proliferation of 
indirect forms of regulation. The core tenet of the paper is that while 
the earlier turn to alternative regulation modes, whether conceptualized 
under the heading of "legal pluralism,"25 "responsive law,"26 or 
"reflexive law"27 in the 1970s and 1980s, had aimed at a more socially 
responsive, contextualized, and ultimately learning mode of legal 
intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist jurisprudence 
embraces a limitation model of legal regulation, the rationale of 
which is captured by references to "efficiency" and "market 
 demands." By treating market demands and private interests as self-
explanatory givens and by shifting the burden for "intervention" into 
market activities to policy-makers and judges, the current turn to private 
ordering effectively takes politics out of the equation.28 With that, the 
neo-formalist and neo-functionalist critique of the welfare state's 
ambitious programs of legal regulation ignores the degree to which the 
welfare state itself always represented only one of many different 
possible institutional evolutionary steps in market regulation and in an 
ongoing societal debate over the best form of governing society.29 To be 
sure, by not integrating the emergence, justification and contestation of 
the welfare state into the present promotion of individual rights against 
governmental paternalism, neo-formalists and neo-functionalists isolate 
their assertions about market-ordering from a wider political debate in 
which institutions such as the rule of law, the social or welfare state, 
private autonomy, property rights and democracy should rightly be 
seen not as means by themselves, but as mere institutional milestones 
and labels in a continuing normative evolution of social ordering.30 
 
B.  Formalism and Functionalism: Then and Now 
The battle between law and politics is nothing new; it marks the legal 
debates throughout the twentieth century. In continental Europe, 
mainly Germany and France, this narrative sequences a development of 
the relation between law and the state from the Rule of 
Law 31 through an Interuentionist ,32 Social state 33 through to the welfare 
 state 34 before depicting a growing tension between transformations of the 
state into an Enabling, or Moderating state 35 on the one 
hand, and new concepts of society (Risk,36 Knowledge, 37 Information,38 
Network Society 39) on the other. In England, the debate was 
predominantly focused on preserving a formal core of law40 against its 
moralization or politicization. 41 By contrast, in the United States, the 
narrative still traces the content, validity and promises of the 
"Realist"42 (later the "Social") challenge to nineteenth century "classical 
legal thought"43 that eventually led to a fierce struggle over "rights"44 and 
to the frustrated reaction in the form of extra-legal activism.45 Next 
occurs the powerful rise of law and economics 46 and the contestation by 
legal pluralism and critical legal studies,47 later opening up into a babel of 
voices of multiple, competing and conflicting societal interests.48 The 
battle over law and politics gains its concrete contours within a specific 
socio-economic, cultural, and political context.49 The relevance of 
comparing different contexts has recently been noted by scholars, who 
have taken it upon themselves to depict larger trends and trajectories in 
the development of legal thought, writing from both a historical and 
comparative perspective. 50 The importance of such barometric and 
comparative assessments lies in their tentative and explorative nature. 
Given the tremendous unruliness of doctrinal categories and of social 
science models and categories with which we have been trying to identify 
the core of law in an age of governance, 51 it is of great merit to push for a 
 historical, comparative and interdisciplinary research program, precisely 
because we are at an important moment for the reassessment of the 
role of law. 
Neo-formalism and neo-functionalism as the angles from which to 
assess the current regulatory landscape shed a brighter light on the role of 
law within the continuing politics of privatization. By focusing on neo-
formalism and neo-functionalism, one gains a clearer view of how 
arguments of "necessity," of "objectivity'' and "naturalness" prepare the 
ground for a functionalist interpretation and application of legal norms in 
contexts that are clearly characterized by fundamental shifts from public to 
private regulation.52 The presently renewed attack on contract adjudication 
and governmental "intervention" wrongly depicts a market existing 
without a government at the very outset.53 This depiction of the market 
and the state as separate worlds enters into a troubling alliance with 
policy recommendations, which promote the privatization of public 
services and are often fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost 
reduction.54 Whether or not, and in which forms, private actors assume 
formerly public regulatory functions, is not simply a sociological issue. It 
represents the outcome of political choices and of other socio-economic 
developments, unfolding at both the national and transnational level.55 The 
allegedly available "fresh start" for societal self-regulation without state 
interference stands in stark contrast to the observation already made 
decades ago that when market actors are enabled and empowered to 
exercise their private autonomy they are exercising this freedom based on 
 a public choice.56 
The law of contract, then, through judges, sheriffs, or marshals puts 
the sovereign power of the state at the disposal of one party to be 
exercised over the other party. [. . .] The law of contract may be 
viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules according to 
which the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as between the 
parties to a more or less voluntary transaction. 57 
AB contractual governance has come, since the 1970s and 1980s, to 
form an ever-more important part of large-scale privatization and 
delegation politics,58 policies of privatizing formerly public services and 
competences by delegating power to lower levels are often implemented 
without a comprehensive normative assessment of the merits and goals of 
such delegation.59 But, the empowerment of market actors often results 
from a complex combination of historically evolved patterns of 
individualism, 60 decentralized government 61 and regulatory competition.62 
The promise of private autonomy and individual freedom, which is being 
carved out within this context can only be understood against the 
background of this historically grown and continuously evolving 
polycontextural architecture.63 Inother words, private autonomy neither 
arises from nor exists in a normative or structural vacuum. 
 
1. Promises of Formalist Law 
 
Ever since Max Weber described legal evolution as occurring on a 
 trajectory from religious (charismatic) through traditional to rational, formal 
authority,64 legal scholars have been conceptualizing new challenges to 
legal regulation against this evolutionary background.65 It is particularly the 
historical, socio-economic context of Weber's writing that proves so 
important for today's assessment of his contribution. Weber's discussion of 
formal law occurred precisely at a time when law's allegedly formal 
qualities had come under close scrutiny from an arising political legal 
theory that targeted the role of judges in "applying the law"66 by resorting 
to a heaven of pure legal concepts.67 Weber's analysis of formal law was 
complemented by keen observations of the institutional changes that 
characterized the new relations between state and market, changes that in 
their complexity had become the focus of emerging sociological thought 
and conceptualization 68 and which soon prompted more explorations of 
turn-of-the-century's industrialization and the emerging hegemony of the  
market.69 
Formal, in contrast to substantive rationality, would claim that the 
law is "inherently certain and predictable." 7° Formalism, en- 
shrined for example in the proposition of the "rule of law," could be 
directed against arbitrary power.71 Taken as such, it would mean to 
resist a "social agenda"72 and "judicial activism"73 in the name of the 
letter of the law.74 Formalism would come to stand at the center of the 
magical, yet fragile, construction of a "rule of law," presupposing the 
law's capacity to negotiate and thereby to translate, according to defined 
 procedural rules, the different contestations and political 
manifestations of diverging interests in society into a reliable and 
predictable catalogue of "state action."75 Yet, as the functions of 
government continued to expand, such translatory practice 76 would 
always carry with it the danger that law would lose its center, its 
foothold and autonomy.77 As formalism claimed that the law could be 
understood from within, primarily by extrapolating a logical structure 
of a confined set of norms from a small set of higher-order 78 principles, the 
need to recognize one or the other substantive bases for the edifice of 
formal law became just too apparent. Lawyers, writing at a time of 
extreme socio-economic and legal crisis, saw clearly that the association 
of a system of law with a particular system of political government 
posed dramatic challenges for any understanding of law in and of itself.79 
Elaborations of the functions of the state in the context of a rapidly 
rising industrial society, accompanied by societal hardship and 
political contestation, exposed legal formalism to a sweeping 
challenge in the name of different values and interests. The more the 
state and its emanations through legislative, administrative and judicial 
acts would change, the more this would have a fundamental impact on 
law itself.BO With formal law turning functional, the covers of formalism's 
foundations were irrevocably drawn away.
81 
 
2. Aspirations of Functionalism 
 
"Therefore the idea of the social man is the only possible starting 
 point of juridical doctrine. "82 
Functionalism could be merely the (younger) sibling of formalism, 
its necessary complementary and correcting feature. Formalist law would 
have to be functional in order to survive challenges arising from societal 
differentiation, political contestation, secularization and economic growth. 
As such, functionalism may also be understood as an outright challenge to 
the formalist claim to self-restriction. Functionalism would then be a fitting 
formula for law's ability to survive, mainly by remaining adaptable and 
responsive. Functionalism in law describes the way in which the 
flexibilization and modernization of formal law, in reaction to an 
increasingly complex social environment, made up of competing 
interests, claims and contestations, takes place if law is to retain a 
steering function in the trials of society. Functionalism, thus understood, 
therefore designates the degree to which the law answers to 
requirements, customs, and necessities emerging from social practice or 
crystallizing out of public policy deliberations. The important feature here 
is that a functionalist approach in any legal area, from administrative to 
contract to corporate law, is based on the premise that regulation is in fact 
possible. What functionalism itself does not answer is who the author of 
regulation should be. 
Where functionalism understands law as a means to achieve 
particular social, political or economic ends,B3 this could speak in favor of 
governmental "intervention" or against it, either stressing the 
'embeddedness' of individual freedom or underlining the merits of 
 unfettered private autonomy.B4 The institutional consequences as well as 
the normative underpinnings of functionalism are not, at first, so easy 
to see. The functionalism that responded to legal formalism's abstract 
sovereignty over a deeply divided, violently emerging market society 
embraced the idea that generally there was, or could be, a societal 
consensus on the desirability of the goals pursued. Given that law was to 
navigate in deeply troubled waters, it was also clear that conflicts would 
inevitably arise with regard to the concrete strategies and instruments to 
pursue those goals.85 Not surprisingly, legal and social theory scholars 
spilled considerable amounts of ink over the optimal conceptualization 
of an adequate regulatory approach to a fast-changing society, 
characterized by the increasing emergence of conflict zones and 
conflicting social interests.86 Scholars of contract law87 began to explore 
the constitutionalizing potential of private law to inform models of "private 
government," unfailingly recognizing the political nature of private law 
regulation. 88 Corporate Law scholars and economists explored the 
troubling position of the 'modern corporation' between private and public 
law, between investors' private property interests and the larger 
societal interests in the sustained economic performance of the 
corporation.89 Echoing corporate lawyers' trouble with delineating the 
optimal forms of regulating business, administrative law scholars found 
themselves between the firing lines of the state and the market in a fast-
evolving mixed economy of intersecting private and public actors.90 In 
the United States as in Western Europe, administrative lawyers were 
 soon awakening to their highly politicized role in operating a 
constitutional polity through the stormy seas of pre-war, interwar and 
post-war economies and ideological contestations of democratic 
government.91 Central to all these scholarly endeavors was the role of 
scientific progress and the role of experts in finding the best legal 
solution.92 A major challenge for legal functionalism, largely unmet, was 
the degree to which a government that was activist, responding to crises 
and delivering public services, could succeed in promoting democratic 
representation in the elaboration and execution of its ambitious policies. 93 
Paving the way for the early twenty-first century's arrival of 
neofunctionalism, the technocratic functionalism of the expanding 
twentieth century welfare state had widened, not bridged, the gap 
between the state and its citizens in complex, differentiated, 
multicultural and transnational societies. 
[A]s the ideals of the Functional Society came only to be 
partly realized in the twentieth-century welfare state, the 
functionalist style in public law tended to preserve itself 
more as a disposition than as the exposition of an alternative 
social philosophy. And once this happened, the more positivistic 
aspects of functionalism (power vs. power) gained the upper 
hand, and the underlying idealist dimensions were 
suppressed.94 
Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff, in German constitutional and 
administrative law, are the most eloquent representatives for this turn 
 of functionalism.95 
 
III. THE CHALLENGES OF Socm-EcoNOMIC REGULATION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
As the debates over the politics of legal regulation continued,96 
later developments, depicted by labels such as globalization, global 
economic competition and deterritorialization, 97 dramatically accentuated 
the normative assumptions underlying the seemingly neutral ideals of 
expert rule and scientific government. AB political governments around the 
world sought to address regulatory challenges arising from cross-border 
developments, the hitherto pursued public programs of social policy came 
to be seen as resting on increasingly shaky ground. As globalization began 
to unfold within the fragile architecture of domestic legal and political 
systems, the challenges to both the regulatory concepts and instruments of 
the social engineers and the political hopes in the self-ordering capacities of 
a democratic society became frighteningly clear. As the time horizon, 
against which scholars and policy makers would commit their inquiry to 
the project of "making basic changes [. . .] necessary if we are to maintain 
the productive capability of the market economy while assuring our 
capacity to maintain a productive and healthy environment,"98 was rapidly 
shrinking, functionalism took on an ever more reactive and responsive 
mode of adaptation. The mounting pressures on political governments to 
master the socio-economic and legal challenges arising from a fast-
globalizing world of increasingly interdependent trade relations were 
amplified by deep-running societal concerns with questions of political 
 participation, representation and redistribution. Thirty years after the end 
of World War II, Western industrialized nations found themselves under 
immense pressure to translate highflying political agendas into workable 
regulatory instruments, which were increasingly met with apathy, alienation 
and implementation obstacles.99 
The challenges of globalization to domestic state-originating welfare 
programs-that had in their growth during the twentieth century 
involved dramatic increases in redistribution, juridification and 
infrastructure provision-had a very domestic face. In fact, the arising 
critique of the welfare state's negative effects on societal self-regulation 
operated with little reference to "globalization." AB the next section will 
show, the rise of welfare state critique and the emergence of alternative 
modes of legal regulation had its origins within the particular regulatory 
histories of expanding forms of state intervention. Globalization, in turn, 
further accentuated and fueled a transformation of public governance 
that was already beginning to unfold from within the cores of western 
welfare states. 
 
A The Emergence of Responsive/Reflexive Law 
The disillusionment both with the propagation of "rights" as a 
means to address social inequality and with the allegedly "neutral" 
principles underlying legal process and adjudication 100 eventually 
prepared the grounds for a growing discontent with law as a sound 
instrument of social change.101 In response, scholars on both sides of the 
 Atlantic began to relativize law's sovereignty. Feeling the weight of 
overly zealous and inadequate forms of ''juridification"102 and facing the 
costs of a structurally and normatively exhausted welfare state,103 
law's autonomy began to be seen as relative. Scholars saw law as one 
among several modes of political regulation, certainly not as the only or 
even the most promising one. Some rejoiced, because they had already 
long been hostile to the state's continued attempts to regulate economic 
relations. 104 Others, however, reacted to the continued expansion of 
rationalist, bureaucratic regulation into the 'life-world' with grave 
concerns over the viability of informal, culturally grounded 
understandings as the basis for societal self-regulation and cohesion.105 
 
1. Responsive Law 
In a small volume, published in 1978, Philippe Nonet and Philip 
Selznick carved out a political theory oflegal regulation, in the center of 
which they placed the concept of "responsive law."106 They aptly 
characterized the contemporary U.S. society as torn by competing 
views on an ideal social order and placed the search for law at the 
center of this larger battle: "Whatever the labels, and whatever the 
ideological affinities, these perspectives are being tested today as legal 
institutions adapt to changing attitudes and expectations, to social 
cleavage and disaffection." 107 Building on Weber's depiction of the 
rational quality of modern law, Nonet and Selznick recognized the 
increasing differentiation of law into specialized areas of social 
 ordering. As Weber had seen the system of law to be depending in 
large part on the emergence of a professional body of legal experts, 
Nonet and Selznick identified how expert rule would promote a separation 
of law and politics and, increasingly, a "narrow conception of the role of 
law."108 As this model of law removed legal regulation and regulators 
"from the ambit of political controversy and conflict,"109 "strains, 
opportunities, and expectations" continued to arise that would lead to a 
conflict-laden re-approximation of law and politics. 110 
The paradox of rational government lay in the fact that the more legal 
experts asserted the objective nature of their actions, the more these 
actions met with critique and resistance. Responsive law, then, would 
emerge against the background of a long-standing skepticism towards the 
autonomy and rationality of law.111 Front and center to a post-
autonomous, responsive model of law would be a form of legal 
regulation that "perceives social pressures as sources of knowledge and 
opportunities for self-correction."112 Responsive law's self-liberation from 
formalism, however, moved a now explicitly "purposive law" (dangerously) 
close to policy. 113 The resulting difficulties would prove immense: 
When accountability is to more general ends, dedication to rules 
is no longer enough to shield officials from criticism. But to 
generalize responsibilities is to run the risk of diluting them. 
General ends tend to be impotent, that is, so abstract and vague 
that they offer neither guidance in decision nor clear standards of 
 evaluation.
114
 
Read against the promises of formalism studied above, the 
functionalist aspirations of responsive law put law and lawyers under 
immense pressure. Responding to the insulation of technocratic legal rule 
from societal negotiations of values and interests asking the law to "foster 
civility" through an "ethic of responsibility," 115 responsive law must 
apparently rely on a problematic inner core in order not to be fully 
consumed by societal forces. This core is formed in a combination of 
process (participation) and substance (civility). At the time of their 
writing, Nonet and Selznick proved perfectly attuned to the particular 
challenges arising from complex governance modes in a system of 
multilayered and interdependent social organizations. Their promotion of 
"post-bureaucratic organization" 116 reflected their valuable interdisciplinary 
search into the emerging complexities of the knowledge society.117 Both 
the procedural and the substantive sides of the reflexive law recipe to 
address regulatory challenges in a divided society, however, prove to be 
extremely ambitious, perhaps too ambitious. Towards the end of their 
book, the authors don't hold back: "Responsive law presupposes a society 
that has the political capacity to face its problems, establish its priorities, and 
make the necessary commitments."118 Here the bias of the program 
becomes strikingly apparent. Against the background of the trajectory of 
legal development from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the 
authors put forward a model of substantive legal regulation that pays a high 
price to bridge the gap between law and politics, between government and 
 society. Recognizing that any reincarnation of top-down regulation, 
regardless of the normative justification that is offered, would further 
widen the legitimacy gap in times of regulatory complexity and political 
apathy, Nonet and Selznick suggest that citizens ought to take law into their 
own hands in order to reach consensus as to the direction of social order. 
This, however, results in a powerful redirection of law to its formalist 
mode, operating in a "heaven of pure legal concepts."119 How else ought 
we to understand the authors' expressed hope that society come together 
and identify "its problems," "its priorities," and "its commitments"? The 
reason for the growing regulatory challenges to modern law was and 
continues to be the rising complexity of society. To address a multiplicity of 
values, interests and rationalities with a dedication to democratic 
governance ultimately to result in consensus, idealizes the forces of cohesion 
in a society that is actually deeply complex and fragmented. Therein lies, to 
be sure, the great danger for law, for political, in particular democratic 
theory and for any grand-scale social theory. Therein lays, however, at the 
same time, great hope to better identify the potential of law to play a distinct 
role in the complex array of voices and forces. 
 
2. Reflexive Law 
Meanwhile, legal theoreticians in Western Europe posited a 
reconceptualization of regulatory law by emphasizing the necessity of 
law's reflexivity, its capacity to respond to the changing conditions of 
regulatory implementation 120 and the proceduralization of law.121 
 Reflexive law promoted the opening of the law to the different, varied and 
competing rationalities of a society highly differentiated along functional 
lines.122 As the project of reflexive law became formulated in the context 
of an exhausted welfare state's regulatory capacities, the nature of law's 
involvement in societal processes was still at the heart of a critical 
inquiry into the role, function and status of law.123 With reflexive law 
emerging out of the eggshells of a fast-decaying welfare state, it was 
conceived in light of a long generation of negative and positive civil 
rights, of a strong interconnection between deliberation over social policy 
on the one hand and of the crossfertilization of administrative and 
constitutional law on the other. 
To be sure, the rise of reflexive law did not occur without 
contestation. Reactions, many of them negative, were swift and far-
reaching. Nik.las Luhmann observed that, if the concept of reflexive law 
implicitly or explicitly defended law's claim to "comprehensive 
regulation,"124 reflexive law unduly and somewhat prematurely 
relativized the concept of system autonomy in a functionally 
differentiated society.125 Others felt that positing law as an "autopoietic," 
i.e., autonomous, self-referentially reproducing, social system126 
constituted a betrayal of law's emancipatory political powers as a force of 
social transformation. 127 Arguing from the perspective of democratic 
theory,128 the turn of law onto itself as autopoietic law was seen as 
bolstering wide-spread privatization and deregulation, which in turn 
 would diminish the emancipatory forces of law.129 Another critique took 
issue with reflexive law's connection to the concept of autopoietic law, 
which described law as operationally closed (self-reproducing) and 
cognitively open (towards its environment), 130 and markedly pointed out 
the specific challenges for political (legal) theory arising from this 
description.131 
Reflexive law theorists, in response, acknowledged the merits of a 
critique of legal formalism and its potential to look beyond the letter of 
the law. But, other than the Legal Realists, proponents of reflexive law 
sought to reach beyond an understanding of law that would describe 
its function in the resolution of conflicts between "right" and "left,"132 
or between market regulation and freedom of contract. 133 The theory of 
autopoietic law, which lay at the basis of the concept of reflexive law, 
posited the self-referential nature of the societal subsystems, including 
law.134 This led to an understanding of society as a social system made 
up of subsystems of particularly structured modes of communications. 
Each subsystem, then, would form the environment for another system, 
leading to a diversified communication of societal (system) rationalities. 
135 The reflexive law theorists rejected a bi-polar view regarding re-
distributive outcomes or progressive versus conservative political agendas. 
Instead, they suggested that although the law was placed at a unique 
place from which it would constantly receive manifold communications, 
influences and pressures from different parts of society, its evolution de- 
pended on its ability to maintain this intricate relationship to its 
 environment. 136 Its self-reproduction depended on its constant exposure 
to the forces of society, while reconstructing these signals in its own 
language or code. Instead of promoting the idea of an a-political law, the 
concept of reflexive law radicalized and expanded the older critique of 
legal formalism and made law receptive to the full spectrum of societal 
rationalities. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the American development became 
determined by an intricate and challenging combination of activist 
rejections of law as an instrument of the status-quo upholding power on 
the one hand and the differentiation of procedural rights on the other. The 
work of Charles A. Reich,137 Marc Galanter, 138 David Trubek,139 
Duncan Kennedy, 140 Gerald Frug, 141 and Richard Stewart142 can be 
seen as illustrative of this complex combination of societal activism and 
conscious embrace of legal regulation. The continued elaboration 143 and 
contestation of these approaches 144 eventually prepared the field for 
assessments of law and regulatory governance, 145 which address the 
serious challenges of identifying the politics in a transnational regulatory 
environment, 146 shaped by both public and private law,147 official and 
unofficial, soft and hard norms. 148 
As demonstrated, concepts of "responsive" or "reflexive" law had 
emerged at the intersection between a turn to or away from law as a 
means of social regulation. Both responsive and reflexive law had sought a 
way out of the dilemmas which had been identified by both progressive 
 and conservative critics of regulation and "juridification."149 In light of 
the growing awareness that legal regulation would have to deal 
simultaneously with an increasingly complex society riddled with 
conflicting interests and identities on the one hand, and with a 
dramatically expanding scope of governmental regulation of areas of 
society previously seen as remote, self-reliant and "private" on the other, 
legal theory had to conceptualize a new model of law adequate to this 
challenge. Responsive/reflexive law offered just that. In an ingenious and 
very ambitious way, responsive/reflexive legal theorists suggested an 
understanding of legal regulation as a process that could not be initiated 
from a central, elevated place of sovereignty in terms of power and 
knowledge. Instead, law would have to be understood as inherently 
caught up in the conflict-ridden processes of a functionally differentiated 
society.150 Despite the difference in degree to which scholars in the 
respective camps were willing to accept the sociological description of a 
post-bureaucratic society151 or a functionally differentiated society,152  
responsive/reflexive law theorists posited that law would have to be 
tentative, experimental, and learning. Such a conception had far-reaching 
consequences for a conceptualization and application of law in an 
environment that had become increasingly complex since the early days 
of the rise of the interventionist state.153 
The striking characteristic of responsive/reflexive law was that it did 
not confine itself to the suggestion of subjecting all legal decisionmaking to 
 sophisticated processes of deliberation and negotiation. The 
proceduralization of law154 did not stop at the formal level, where it 
certainly led to a far-reaching reliance on procedure as a means to 
strengthen the law's sensitivity to ''voice" over "exit."155 What would 
instead become central to the concept of reflexive law was its intricate 
(and contested) connection between formal and substantive aspects 
oflegal regulation. 156 While the formal aspects concerned the opening up 
of the legal decision-making process to a process of societal deliberations 
("voice"), the substantive side of reflexive law could not have been 
conceived in a more radical fashion. Giving up any hope to ground a 
viable legal judgment on principle based on rational consideration, on 
faith, or on specific political views, reflexive law theorists argued that the 
responses of law to a specific context would inevitably emerge as a 
result of never-ending processes of specialized rationality collisions.157 
In this way, reflexive law took seriously the longstanding contention 
of law's perennial indeterminacy, 158 but it went further than that. 
While the critique of legal formalism as an ideology and a mask to cover 
up political motives and economic rationalities 159 asserted the 
possibility of identifying a specific political concept or regulatory idea, 
which could be taken as the basis of a legal decision (the "social" or 
"material" challenge to formal law),160 reflexive law came to reject such 
mono-causalities of, say, politics, or the economy, as explaining legal 
decision-making. Once it was found impossible to determine the content 
of the law without uncovering the values, ideas and interests that had 
 found their way into a norm, it became clear that the law, being 
operationally closed and cognitively open, had to be seen as standing 
in a very particular relationship with those social spheres, which are 
themselves determined by rationalities other than those that governed 
law and legal thinking. It is here that the reflexive law theorists moved 
beyond the critique of the indeterminacy of law developed by the legal 
realists and critical legal studies and radicalized the idea of law's 
indeterminacy to reconstruct law as one rationality among others in 
society. As a result, society itself ceased to be conceivable as a unified, 
overseeable and identifiable entity against which it is possible to 
uncover the ideological basis of law.161 Such a model of society makes it 
impossible for lawyers to identify one single, decisive motive behind a 
legal argument. Instead, the task of lawyers would be to recognize the 
many ways in which the law is in fact responsive to and refiexive of the 
many different societal rationalities, which the law was charged to 
"translate" or to "reformulate" into its own language, using the legal 
code. 162 Law, in this understanding, is to be conceived as both 
distinct-when considering its own rationality and ways of "thinking'' 
and "speaking''-and simultaneously immersed in society's ongoing process 
of differentiation, conflict and experimentation. "A reflexive orientation 
does not ask whether there are social problems to which the law must be 
responsive. Instead it seeks to identify opportunity structures that allow 
legal regulation to cope with social problems without, at the same time, 
irreversibly destroying patterns of social life."163 
  
B.  Faces in the Mirror 
"One can reject the imperialist claims of the criterion of efficiency 
and at the same time use economic k nowledge in order to 
understand what happens when the logic of legal structures and 
that of economic structures impinge on each other."164 
 
It is important to keep this background in mind, when assessing 
contemporary developments. Today's combination of neo-formalism and 
neo-functionalism occurs ""after the welfare state" and in denial of it. It 
portrays law's primary role as serving society's needs to govern itself and 
thereby blinds us to the historically grown embeddedness of private 
ordering in a sophisticated legal-pluralist framework. What today's 
functionalism suggests is a smooth ride in social selfregulation from 
which the law should, for the most part, be excluded or at least be kept at 
a distance. It thereby obscures the deeply conflictual and hybrid nature 
of legal regulation of which scholars throughout the twentieth century 
had always been so conscious. Whereas historically formalism and 
functionalism related to each other by way of conceptual and political 
contestation, it seems today that both formalism and functionalism have 
joined ideologically in that both present law as a politically neutralized 
tool of expert management. This turns the earlier, historical turn of 
lawyers to science and expertise 165 on its head. The neutralization of 
law has consequences: on the one hand, law is expected today to 
 function in its traditional mode where "true" legal expertise is required, 
for example in the protection of property interests through the formal 
application of allegedly "clear" legal norms. 166 On the other hand, law 
should be reflexive, meaning facilitative, indirectly intervening, 
empowering, where external expertise-mostly of "market," but also of 
the "scientific" kind-is believed to be better equipped to facilitate social 
ordering. This combination is ideological because both of these fields of 
expertise are considered a-political, when in fact in all these references 
to "law," the "market," and "experts," the choice takes place within 
political, economic and other normative frameworks. Neo-formalism and 
neo-functionalism transform formalism and functionalism respectively. 
Formalism is no longer seen as aspiring to, or supported by, a 
specific or general logical coherence; instead, it becomes a fighting word 
against what is now deemed to be legal '"intervention'" into otherwise 
more efficient processes of social selfgovernance. Functionalism is no 
longer associated with the aspiration to achieve a specific goal and 
with the political debate out of which a consensus in support of that 
goal eventually arose; instead, all legal intervention is to take place or to 
be withheld in accord with, and in response to, the "needs" of a functional 
group. It is the particular context, the political climate and capacity to 
promote certain views that shapes the communication of such needs. 
The current revival of both formalism and functionalism occurs 
according to a regulatory agenda and political outlook entirely different 
from that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two 
 developments are of relevance here: one concerns the delay with which 
the changed social environment was methodologically assessed by 
administrative and, certainly, by constitutional law scholars.167 The 
other one arises from the unresolved status of the political relevance of 
the rule of law or, in other words, the role of law in regulation. The 
urgency of questioning what lies behind this misalignment is further 
manifested by the manner in which progressive agendas are today 
again clashing with claims to technical expertise. What we see colliding 
are claims of bureaucratic discretion with those of judicial and 
democratic review and control as well as claims of individual autonomy 
with concerns over paternalistic public governance by the state.168 The 
recurrence of the same oppositional patterns, which already 
characterized administrative law debates over one-hundred years 
ago,169 prompts the question what the differences might be between the 
discussions then and those taking place now. What occupies the space 
between the rise of the Providential State of the early twentieth century 
170 and the Enabling State of the early twentyfirst? This unanswered 
question drives the powerful revival of formalism and functionalism 
in current regulatory theory and practice. 171 
 
1. The Turn to Market 
"If the future already lay in history's wallet, the social-political 
task was to call its impending forms into being."172 
 Across the divides of disciplinary subfields, a growing number of 
scholars are promoting the return to a strictly limited role of the law in 
favor of a market-based regime of self-regulation. The neo-formalists and 
neo-functionalists confess to a troubling loss of faith in adjudication 173 in 
the name of an approach to legal regulation that is allegedly more 
responsive to market demands and less prone to the much-contested 
attempts at social engineering by judges. 174 The renewed hostility 
towards judges is nourished by decades of policydriven, substantivist 
judicial interpretation of legal rules.175 The invocation of formalism now 
serves to tame, stifle and silence a judiciary, which is seen as "activist" 
and overzealous. 176 
The lack of sophistication of this analysis is striking. If it were 
really true that there can be an effective rule making and rule 
application, but that it should not be placed in the hands of overzealous 
judges, we could indeed be prompted to take the anti-judiciary affect 
seriously. Instead, the attack on judges becomes an attack on the law 
itself, which the neo-formalist reduces to a spiritless, technical body of 
rules, allegedly made by men and best placed in the hands of men-
not of judges. This move against the judiciary and the law seeks to 
obscure the fundamental quality of rules, which are, in the moment that 
they are applied through a commonly established institutional set-up, 
always already "pieces in a larger compromise of interests" and as such 
not amenable to ad-hoc changes, whether in the name of ''justice" or any 
other "spirit."177 
 To be sure, the problem that motivates the critique of adjudication is 
not whether it is judges, parliaments or administrative agencies that are 
making rules. It is the idea that law is part of a larger normative 
framework, the actual realization of which has been, mostly for 
historically contingent reasons, 178 placed within a particular institutional, 
complex political, socio-economic framework that is particularly 
troubling to the neo-formalists and neo-functionalists. It is for this reason 
that appeals to legislative action over judicial activism or, say the work 
of expert committees, 179 are mere smoke and mirrors. Even if the 
legislator demanded of the judge to act "formally," it would still be the 
case that the judge must ask exactly the same question about this rule as 
about any other that comes to him (or her) from the legislature. Its 
enactment represented a compromise of interests based on some set of 
quite possibly conflicting expectations about how its application would 
affect the future distribution of satisfactions. 180 
This new confidence in a formalist understanding of law is 
accompanied by a powerful and highly influential defense of functionalist 
approaches to legal regulation. Judges and, for that matter, lawmakers, 
should "interfere" with societal processes of self-organization only where 
there is a legitimate basis for such intervention, which means that they 
should usually abstain. The critique of the role of judges is thus 
intimately tied to a radical critique of the state and of law as both an 
institution and instrument of social change. Whereas at the height of the 
turn-of-the-century Interventionist and emerging welfare state 
 functionalism would encompass the administration's use of law as an 
instrument of social change, often pushed forward against the resistance 
of a conservatively staffed judiciary,181 today's neo-functionalism seeks to 
domesticate both the state and the judiciary by emphasizing state 
institutions' incompetence to properly order society. Instead, the neo-
functionalist emphasizes society's quasi-natural powers to self-regulate its 
affairs, without undue and ill-fitting intervention by public authorities. 
 
2. Conceptual Paths 
Conceptually, form and function have always been two sides of the 
same coin. The appeal of formalism to coherence, authority and unity 
stands in an ambiguous relation to the aspiration of functionalism to 
substantive goals, ends-means correlations 182 and institutional 
instrumentalization. But the modesty of one-formalism-is the hubris 
of the other-functionalism. The functionalist's submission of legal 
instruments to substantive goals had to reckon with the normative 
grounds of formal guarantees, rights, and procedures. Recognizing that 
the grounds of legal unity and legal instrumentalism are inherently 
caught in a paradoxical relation, 183 formalists and functionalists saw 
how they were inextricably intertwined so that one approach could never 
exist without the other. 
Against the background of rich historical and conceptual studies, 
comparative legal scholarship has only slowly begun to explore the 
parallels, disjunctures and overlaps between public and private 
 regulatory law here and there. After conflict of laws scholars had already 
posited the need to embed their assessments in a deeper comparative 
understanding of the existing publidprivate regulatory cultures in 
different countries in the 1970s,184 impulses today are coming from 
administrative law scholars on the one hand 185 and constitutionalization 
scholars on the other.186 As these inquiries continue, one 
canunsurprisingly-recognize a distinct renaissance of visions of social 
order without formal law elements lying at their base. 187 While not 
intended, this "new legal pluralism," as pointed out by its discontents, 
188 runs the risk of sailing hard on the winds of neo-liberal, deregulatory 
politics. 189 
It is against this background that we may gain a deeper, 
contextualized, understanding of the present dominance of functionalism 
in many fields of law and policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Certainly 
after 1989, there has been an ever more widely held view that we are 
witnessing a global convergence of modes of thinking about economic 
regulation and state governance. The "end of history," so famously 
declared by Fukuyama in 1992,190 eventually eclipsed the account by 
Michel Albert, that even in light of strong trends of convergence, 
differences between capitalist regimes would remain strong.191 The 
pervasive power of the end of history thesis in law has put promoters of 
differentiated, historically informed assessments of the role of law as an 
instrument of social change on the defensive, while allowing for 
ubiquitous references to the law and the "rule of law" to occur in even the 
 most complex regulatory contexts. 192 
3.  Deja Vu? The Discursive Return of Reflexive Law 
The current operation of formalist/functionalist concepts in legal 
regulation builds on regulatory experiences that unfolded in the last few 
decades and that are without direct parallels to the first waves of 
formalist thinking at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries. It is 
an important feature of the current legal regulatory discourse that its 
participants are arguing against the background of a complicated and 
sobering set of experiences with law.193 From the impossibility of 
preventing outrageous crime194 to law's exhaustion throughout the 
ambitious progressive political attempts to consolidate "rights" as core 
assets in a liberal society, 195 law has come to be conceptualized as 
playing a highly ambivalent role in a deregulatory, privatized 
environment. 196 The long-term consequences of the recent, admittedly 
moderate, experimentations with finding a 'third way' between socialism 
and capitalism are still matters of speculation. 197 Meanwhile, the law 
has become a problematic, at best ambivalent, and often seemingly 
unreliable player in the discursive set of contemporary politics. 198 Law's 
memory becomes increasingly short-lived, and high stakes of political 
contestation, such as the fight over consumer protection rights, 199 are 
eventually leveled and comfortably integrated into mainstream legal 
discourse. It becomes ever more difficult to trace, let alone to teach, the 
reality of conflict over rights even in recent history.200 Because of the 
hegemony of economic thinking in law,201 law is caught in polarizing 
 debates over efficiency vs. planning, private vs. public ordering, self-
government vs. command/ control, etc. Still, contemporary discussions 
about the merits and limits of privatization should always be taken as 
reflections on a longstanding struggle over social emancipation and 
contested forms of political government. Contractual governance is in 
the center of contemporary privatization and post-privatization 
discourses.202 
 
IV. CONTRACT VERSUS CONTRACT LAW: THE FALSE PROMISE OF SOCIAL 
NORMS 
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to a brief discussion of how 
formalistlfunctionalist legal thinking has become crucial in a central area of 
contemporary regulatory debate. The neo-formalist and neo-functionalist 
turn of contractual governance reveals how variations of 
responsive/reflexive law have further accentuated the detachment of 
contract regulation from a larger political contestation of the goals of 
contractual governance. Yet, the response cannot simply be to aim at a re-
politicization of contract law. Against the theoretical background of a 
functionally differentiated society, it is more adequate to understand 
contract law as a troubled site of intense regulatory experimentation and 
innovation. Contract law is a central example of "law after the welfare 
state," because it represents a regulatory regime that is constituted and 
shaped by an ambiguous relationship between "state" and "society" in 
the institutional evolution from the Rule of law to the welfare state. In 
the neo-formalist and neo-functionalist reading, however, contractual 
 governance is offered as a formidable solution to the paradox of 
formalist/functionalist law, which it manages in turn to eclipse in its 
entirety. 
 
A.  Social Norms versus Law? 
The present contestation of contract adjudication and the promotion 
of social norms as offering a more efficient regulatory framework than 
governance by contract law203 is a representation par excellence of private 
law "after the welfare state." This invocation of social selfregulation, 
which is primarily fuelled by a deep skepticism about the political 
regulation of commercial relations, is further accentuated in the context 
of an increasingly de-territorialized sphere of economic interaction. 204 
To be sure, the reference to the transnational nature of commercial 
activity serves as a ground for turning against contract adjudication also 
on the domestic level. Another lesson of the twentieth century regulatory 
experience with reflexive law is-deliberately-cast aside: in order to fully 
understand the dynamics of regulatory politics on a larger scale, we 
need to carefully trace the contextual conditions under which we make 
legal arguments. In the reductionist form in which 'traditionalists' are 
contrasted with "transnationalists"205 it is to be feared that the fight for 
recognition of the latter results in the undoing of the emancipation of 
the former. 
In turn, the maneuvering room for courts adjudicating derailed 
contractual arrangements is shrinking as social norms are seen as providing 
 a comparatively more efficient and cost-reducing regulatory tool.206 The 
legal system recedes into the background from where contract parties 
merely perceive it as a threat, not as fundamentally structuring the 
arrangements to begin with. This approach to social norms breaks not 
only with the analysis of the political basis of both contractual 
arrangements and the market,207 it also aims to disentangle contractual 
governance from the socio-economic, formal/informal context in which 
actors make choices. This marks the social norms theorists' deliberate 
departure from work on relational contract and "private govemment"208 
that had grown out of the legal realist critique of classical legal contract 
theory.209 Earlier work by progressive lawyers had identified the growing 
difficulties of situating modem contractual governance in either the public 
(law) or private (law) realm, recognizing that both were two sides of the 
same coin of contractual governance.210 In contrast, social norms scholars 
from law and economics (L&E) seek to redraw the demarcation lines 
between the market and the state. Their interest in social norms is not in 
the basis of norm-making as part of a larger exploration of sites of social 
will-formation, but instead reflects their intention to insulate phenomena 
of contemporary regulatory governance from more comprehensive 
assessments of the contexts in which governance modes are emerging. 
 
B.  Economics versus Justice 
 
"Apost-ind ustrial society must discover ways to decentralize not 
 only commodity prod uction, but also significant ways of 
lawmaking.'211 
The recent "discovery" of social norms by L&E scholars212 occurs in 
striking insulation not only from a longstanding and intense scholarly 
debate,213 but also from a tremendously rich and troubled historical 
evolution of regulatory politics in the area of contract law. With little 
historical interest in such accounts, the L&E interest in norms is biased 
towards a particular, efficiency-oriented understanding of norms and 
regulation in present-day contestations of allegedly excessive state 
intervention. This approach, however, closes all doors on a more nuanced 
understanding of the forever fragile relationship between social norms 
and the legal form, one that stood at the centre of landmark work in the 
sociology of law.214 It in fact makes a mockery of long-standing insights 
into the artificial nature of all legal propositions.215 Instead of perceiving 
social norms as "living law" and as a platform for a more comprehensive 
exploration of present-day regulatory proposals against the background of 
the evolutionary trajectory of welfare and post-welfare state "regulatory 
cultures,"216 today's neo-formalists and neo-functionalists' attack on law is 
more than a mere plea to recognize the (self-)regulatory capacity of 
social norms. It is, rather, the rejection of a critical assessment of how 
norms are being translated into law, how legal formation takes place in 
the context of highly differentiated and, thus, always contested spheres 
of social activity. What really lies behind the plea for social norms over 
law is not a genuine interest in norm-formation but a disregard for 
 processes of negotiation and contestation. This explains the hesitant 
reception of legal sociology and the even greater reluctance towards 
legal pluralism in the otherwise wholehearted proclamation of the 
primacy of norms over law. While sociological and legal pluralist 
research on norms has for a long time failed to exert significant 
influence on norm-theory, perhaps because of the area's preoccupation 
with groups as "operative agents" and L&E scholars' respective focus on 
"methodological individualism,"217 there are a few signs for change.218 
Clearly, the demand for a fuller appreciation of sociological and legal 
pluralist work in the ongoing exploration of the law after the welfare 
state is enormous, and one can reasonably expect that the sophistication 
of the research in increasingly combining domestic perspectives with 
careful studies of emerging transnational regulatory patterns will 
eventually influence the present work on norms. 
The current introspection is important in the context of this paper 
not only because it illustrates the contentious relationship between 
formal and informal law, an understanding of which is central to present 
studies of contemporary law making developments in different areas of 
law.219 The new interest in norms also underlines the precarious status 
of legal regulation per se. In an increasingly transnational regulatory 
environment, contractual governance-traditionally torn between 
contentions of contract's political nature and private autonomy-unfolds 
in a polycontextural sphere which renders any attempt to safely anchor 
contract law in this or that social theory, largely futile.220 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has traced the rising prominence of formalism and 
functionalism in diverse areas of "post-welfare state" legal regulation as 
un-ironic recurrences of the twentieth century's quest for law. Today, 
formalist, functionalist, responsive, reflexive and autopoietic law is 
everywhere. Lawyers can snatch up everything and make it their own-a 
matter of conversation, the subject of a lawsuit or an essential element 
of a social utopia, seen now through a lawyer's eyes. But the real 
conceptual contribution of autopoietic law to the previously revisited 
historical narrative of formalist/functionalist law is one that is, strikingly, 
at the center of contemporary assessments of institutional 
development.221 The concept of autopoietic law helps to carve out the 
particularity of the legal operation in distinction to any other form of 
societal communication, be it politics, religion, art or economics. Law's 
particularity relies on its self-referentiality, its being thrown back onto 
its own mode of operation, its self-referential reproduction of its system's 
content and form through its code, unique to law and at the basis of any 
aspiration to unity and cohesion.222 The radicality of the concept is 
becomes apparent when we contrast the historical with the conceptual 
sketch. Whereas the former would "find" law to be, at least since 
Western modernity, invariably tied up with different emanations of the 
state,223 autopoietic law detaches law from its-historically contingent-
institutional affiliation, but understands law in its raw exposure to its 
 social environment. In that sense, law in fact is everywhere, and it has no 
choice. The law's presence in societal conflict is brought into even 
sharper relief when we see that its institutional constellation with the 
state is only one among endless possibilities of law's exposure to and its 
role in society. Autopoietic law, then, radicalizes the particularity of 
law's operation by emphasizing its self-referential code-driven quality 
on the one hand while laying bare law's openness, diffusion, 
vulnerability and fragility in societal processes on the other. 
This gives an entirely new meaning to the formalism/functionalism 
narrative that we have seen to be central to law's trajectory in the 
twentieth century. Autopoietic law emphasizes how both the positivist and 
critical descriptions of formalism underestimate the closure of law's self-
referential reproduction, which only operates through law-internal 
terminology. While the legal positivist pays a high price for law's inner 
coherence,224 the critical legal scholar risks losing law as form by 
decrying it as camouflage for different emanations of power. In turn, 
autopoietic law radicalizes the functionalist's instrumentalization of law as 
a means of social engineering by leaving the driver's seat empty. 
Rejecting the idea that law, from any single "outside" point, could 
determine the outcome of social conflicts, autopoietic law stresses the 
way in which law is a mere, yet highly particular, form of 
communication. Building on the concept of a functionally differentiated 
society, the law can no longer be seen as performing a particularly 
determinative or representative function with regard to economic, political 
 or other interests but itself can only perform a legal function. Instead of 
being removed from society, law is part of it, everywhere exposed to and 
in communication with it. 
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